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CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN SELECTED 
WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES 




The corporate accountability of selected countries studying is based on the corporate 
boards efficacy and the protection of minority shareholders. In this paper, the aim 
is reviewing changes in corporate accountability in selected Western Balkan (WB) 
countries. The data are used on an annual basis, and it is taken from the World 
Economic Forum (WEF). The analysis is done for the period 2008-2018, and for 
selected Western Balkan countries. Our results show that Montenegro and 
Macedonia have the best average score for all investigated indicators, but Serbia 
has the worst average score. Additionally, the highest average value of Efficacy of 
corporate boards indicator is observed in 2016-2017, while the lowest average value 
of this indicator is observed in 2011-2012. Contrary, Protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests indicator had the highest average value in 2008-09, while 
it’s the lowest average value was in 2017-2018. 
 
Keywords: corporate accountability, corporate boards' efficacy, protection of 
minority shareholders' interests, Western Balkan 
INTRODUCTION 
The corporate board members, management and shareholders do activities in the best 
interests of the company, when governance structure includes the clearly defined 
rights and responsibilities of all stakeholders. The adequate corporate governance 
structure has to contribute to the decision-making system improvement. 
 
The improvement of the institutional environment in the corporate sector, among 
other, implies the improvement of the corporate board’s efficiency and the protection 
of minority shareholders' interests. Good corporate governance comprises an 
effective, professional and independent corporate board that works in the best 
interests of the enterprise and protects the rights of shareholders. Minority 
shareholders are not in a position to control effectively the management, and the 
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corporate board’s role is very important in overseeing executive bodies on behalf of 
all shareholders (IFC, 2011). Satisfactory quality of corporate ethics and corporate 
governance stimulates the increase in the financial success of companies, investors 
and society as a whole.  
 
The goal of this paper is to review the changes in corporate accountability in selected 
countries of the Western Balkans. Corporate accountability is defined based on the 
efficiency of corporate boards and the protection of minority shareholders' interests. 
The analysis is based on the WEF indicators for the period 2008-2018 for the four 
Western Balkan countries (Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro). The data 
are used on an annual basis. The analysis of corporate accountability indicators for 
selected Western Balkan countries contains ranks and indicators scores. In addition, 
it is calculated and presented the descriptive statistics of indicators on the average 
level for the period from 2009 to 2019 by countries, and as well as, for the selected 
countries of the Western Balkans by years.  
 
Apart from the introductory (first section) and the conclusion (fifth section), the 
paper consists of three parts. The second section investigates the efficiency of 
corporate boards as a dimension of corporate accountability. The protection of 
minority shareholders’ interests as the segment of corporate accountability is 
explained in the third section. The fourth section analyses the corporate 
accountability in selected Balkans countries. This section contains data, 
methodology, and results that include corporate accountability indicators' rank 
analysis and results of descriptive statistics.  
DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY  
Corporate accountability is one of the relevant dimensions of the accountability 
concept. The accountability is an important pillar of corporate governance whereby 
responsible behaviour is sought to be provided by various external and internal 
mechanisms. Regardless of how the concept of accountability can be defined in 
different ways, effective accountability implies the application of principles related 
to clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of all participants, transparent 
definition of expected performance, balanced expectations and capacities, credible 
reporting, review of set goals and subsequent adjustments (Office of the Auditor 
General of Canada, 2002). Respecting good corporate governance practices implies 
the professional and moral responsibility of the management. 
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Efficacy of corporate boards  
The improvement of the corporate governance quality becomes inevitable in modern 
society with particular emphasis on the efforts invested by regulatory institutions. 
Rules pertaining to the independence and size of corporate boards, the independence 
of the audit committee and the role of a director may improve the quality of corporate 
governance. 
 
Legal entities of capital define the management forms within their founding acts. 
Depending on the governance system, companies have the board of directors or the 
executive board and supervisory board. The Board of directors exists in a single-tier 
management system, while a two-tier management system includes the Supervisory 
board and Executive board. The main competencies of the Board of directors are in 
the domain of determining the company’s strategy and business objectives, as well 
as the supervision of their implementation. Some of the responsibilities of the Board 
are related to the management and the organization of internal supervision in the 
company, policy of appointment and compensation to directors. 
 
The board of directors is tasked to provide adequate corporate governance in order 
to ensure answers to key issues related to the construction and maintenance of an 
effective decision-making process and, among others, the selection of qualify human 
resources (Stavanović & Belopavlović, 2012). 
 
The competence of the members of the board of directors is a relevant factor for the 
correct regulation of relationship in the corporate governance structure. For this 
purpose, it is often necessary to make changes in the board’s structure, in order to 
provide that independent members gain the more significant role in the committee. 
Together with the executive directors, the company should also appoint non-
executive directors required to oversee the executive directors. It is significant that 
at least one of non-executive directors should not be the employee of the company, 
at the same time. The board of directors that controls the executive directors protects 
the interests of the capital owners. 
 
The presence of a dual director’s role (when appearing both in the role of the director 
and in the role of the chairman of the board of directors), the number of directors in 
the board, the percentage of independent directors in the board, and the percentage 
of independent directors in the audit committee are factors potentially used as a 
measure of the quality of corporate governance (Byard et al. 2006). A board under 
the influence of executive directors, a director being in the same time a chairman of 
the board, an inadequate number of board members, are factors that could be causes 
of the impairment of the corporate governance quality. A large number of board 
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members make communication more difficult, and the decision-making process 
becomes slower and less efficient. 
 
Members of the corporate board in a modern business environment confront with 
numerous requirement and ever-increasing responsibilities. Committees can provide 
significant assistance to the boards in carrying out defined tasks, being special bodies 
whose members can greatly improve the work with their knowledge, work 
experience and expertise in certain areas. The corporate boards in Europe most often 
have assistance in decision-making, overseeing their implementation and performing 
expert tasks by the Audit Committee, the Fee Commissions, the Appointments 
Committee and the Strategic Planning Commission. 
 
The corporate board is obliged to establish an Audit Committee, regardless of the 
chosen management system and should assume responsibility for its setting up and 
efficient functioning. The Audit Committee as a supervisory body appointed to 
oversee the accounting process, the financial reporting process and the audit of the 
company’s financial statements (Petković, 2010) is an important determinant of the 
corporate governance quality. The Committee should enjoy substantial 
independence in relation to the company’s management, ensuring with no pressure 
the realization of the tasks related to the overseeing of the financial reporting process, 
supervision of the selection of accounting policies, monitoring of internal control 
and appointment and supervision of the independent auditors work. In addition to 
the aforementioned tasks, the Audit Committee is tasked with contacting external 
auditors and considering misunderstandings that may arise between external auditors 
and managers during the audit process and should meet at least once a year without 
the presence of insiders (Todorović, 2010). 
 
After numerous financial scandals, significant reforms were initiated regarding the 
work of the audit commissions and its communications with external auditors. Some 
of the news is that the audit report has to be submitted directly to the audit committee, 
which particularly emphasizes the fact that the auditors are responsible to 
shareholders rather than to management of the company (Milojević, 2006). 
 
Companies that follow good corporate governance practice, regardless of whether 
they have a legal obligation, should form a corporate board and an audit committee 
in order to improve the governance and business decision-making process. 
Protection of minority shareholders’ interests  
A plainly defined accountability by corporate board members to shareholders and to 
the company is a relevant factor for minority shareholders protecting. The 
unsatisfactory level of voluntary acceptance of the obligations and principles of 
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corporate governance by managers and majority capital owners suggest that minority 
shareholders may seek the protection of their rights primarily in the legal system and 
competent institutions such as courts, the Privatization Agency, the Belgrade Stock 
Exchange, the Securities Commission, etc. (Stevanović & Jovičić, 2016). 
 
The mechanisms for the protection of the minority shareholders’ interests in Serbia 
are in general defined by the Companies Law, the Capital Market Law and the 
Takeover Law of Joint Stock Companies. An analysis of the aforementioned acts 
and related EU directives, carried out by Đulić and Kuzman (2012) showed that the 
laws are fully in line with EU directives in the field of minority shareholders’ rights, 
and in certain provisions, they are even more detailed and rigorous. A legal 
framework for the formal protection of investors in Serbia exists, but the ineffective 
application of the current regulations can make the low level of protection of the 
minority shareholders’ rights. 
 
The privatization model in Serbia through a public auction or tender did not favour 
minority shareholders. The remaining minority packs were purchased in order to 
create majority ownership and withdraw from the stock market. The market-share 
trade in minority packages participated in the total turnover on the stock exchange 
with only 5-7%. The Belgrade Stock Exchange played the role of a privatization 
mechanism, where after the formation of the controlling package of shares, every 
further trade was stopped (Ristić & Tanasković, 2011). 
 
A possibility of minority shareholders to require additional audit when suspecting 
the objectivity of financial statements and auditor’s reports, as a result has the 
improvement of management control and reduction of possible conflicts both in a 
relation between management and shareholders, and a majority and minority 
shareholders (Dragašević & Lakičević, 2007). Adequate influence of minority 
shareholders on the election of members of the board through cumulative voting or 
through the rights of nominating candidates by shareholders with a certain share in 
the capital is a feature of good corporate governance practice to be tended to. 
THE ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN SELECTED 
WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES 
Data and Methodology 
Some of the international organizations, including the World Economic Forum – 
WEF, International Institute for Management Development – IMD, World Bank and 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) focus on the 
assessment of the competitiveness of national economies on a multi-criteria basis. 
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The analysis of the relative competitive position of the countries, made by various 
international institutions, shows that any methodology for measuring 
competitiveness can be useful because it emphasizes different aspects of economic 
performance and the country’s position. The economic status of the selected country 
cannot be correctly foreseen by relying solely on one methodology or data, but 
several criteria should be used (Stošić & Minović, 2014). Although researches have 
confirmed that among the generally accepted competitiveness measurements 
models, the Global Competitiveness Index is the most adequate for the Western 
Balkan countries. In order to obtain better results, it is recommended to apply a factor 
method for reducing the number of variables.  
 
The analysis of the corporate accountability changes in selected Western Balkan 
countries was carried out by using WEF indicators (Efficacy of corporate boards 
indicator, Ethical behaviour of firms’ indicator and Protection of minority 
shareholders’ interest indicator) reported in the Global Competitiveness Reports for 
the period from 2008 to 2019. The Global Competitiveness indicator and Institution 
indicators were used for comparative analysis. The indicator trend analysis for 
selected WB countries includes ranks, while descriptive statistics are calculated 
based on indicators scores graded on a scale from 1 (worst score) to 7 (best score). 
Descriptive statistics are presented for selected indicators on average for the period 
2008-2018 by country, while for the selected Western Balkans countries by years. 
Corporate accountability indicators' rank analysis 
Indicators assessing the corporate governance environment, together with indicators 
of public institutions represent the determinants of GCI’s pillar 1 – Institutions. 
Institution indicator and GCI were used due to realizing the comparative analysis for 
the selected Western Balkan countries, with the exemption of data for Macedonia in 
the last year 2017-2018, for all monitored indicators. Macedonia is excluded due to 
insufficient data for this year. 
 























Serbia 108 110 120 121 130 126 122 120 115 104 
Croatia 74 85 86 90 98 93 87 89 89 102 
Macedonia 90 83 80 81 78 60 45 52 67  
Montene-
gro 59 52 45 42 44 52 59 70 80 66 
Source: World Economic Forum 
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From table 1 we can see that Montenegro was the best ranked according to 
Institutions indicator from 2008-2009 to 2013-2014, but Serbia had the worst rank 
of this indicator during the whole observed period. From 2014-2015 to 2016-2017, 
Macedonia was the best ranked. 
 
The WB countries' ranks of Ethical behaviour of firms indicator are better than ranks 
of Institutions indicator in last three observed years. All analysed countries have a 
better rank of Institutions indicator than ranks Protection of minority shareholders’ 
interests indicators during the observed period. The relation between Institutions 
indicator and Efficacy of corporate boards indicator ranks is different depending on 
observed countries and years.  
 
In 2008-2009 Croatia had the best rank according to GCI, then follow Montenegro, 
Serbia, and Macedonia. In the coming years (from 2009-2010 to 2014-2015) 
Montenegro was the best ranked according to GCI, but Serbia was the worst ranked. 
Macedonia had the best rank of GCI in 2015-2016 and 2016-2017, but Serbia again 
had the worst GCI rank. In 2017-2018, Croatia was the best ranked according to 
GCI.  
 
Minović & Moravčević-Lazarević (2016) analysed GCI for each Balkan country in 
the period 2006-2016. They showed that Slovenia has dominated on the Balkan in 
this period, according to the value of this index. Serbia, Albania and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are among the countries with the lowest average competitiveness in the 
Balkans. Their results show that Albania had the highest instability of 
competitiveness, and Serbia had the lowest instability of competitiveness.  
 
Serbia has better GCI rank than the rank of Ethical firms’ behaviour indicator in 
analysed period. For the other observed countries, there were no the same trends. All 
analysed countries have a better rank of GCI than ranks of Efficacy of corporate 
boards and Protection of minority shareholders’ interests indicators during the 
observed period. 
 
























Serbia 96 110 120 130 132 127 119 115 109 99 
Croatia 77 66 73 89 94 76 71 80 88 97 
Macedonia 104 77 77 95 100 74 45 47 54  
Montenegro 76 53 52 47 50 58 76 69 67 56 
Source: World Economic Forum 
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In Table 2 are presented ranks of Ethical behaviour of firms indicator. Table 3 
contains ranks of Efficacy of corporate boards indicator, while Table 4 contains rank 
of Protection of minority shareholders’ interests indicator. 
 
According to the data presented in Table 2, it can observe that Macedonia had the 
worst rank of Ethical behaviour of firms indicator in 2008-2009, then follow Serbia, 
while Montenegro had the best rank of this indicator in this year. From 2009-2010 
to 2013-2014, Montenegro had the best rank of this indicator. Serbia had the worst 
rank of this indicator in each year of analysed period. Macedonia had the best rank 
of this indicator from 2014-2015 to 2016-2017.  
 
Đuričin et al. (2013) studied whether companies in Serbia inherent ethical behaviour 
in interaction with government officials and companies. The results show that the 
surveyed entrepreneurs rated the ethical behaviour of companies in Serbia at an 
average of 3.2 from a maximum of 7 points. 
 
Characteristics of corporate governance, observing the level of accountability the 
company’s management provides towards investors and corporate boards are 
presented in Table 3, for the selected countries. 
 
Table 3: Rank of Efficacy of corporate boards indicator 






















Serbia 119 120 134 136 141 138 125 111 99 85 
Croatia 103 115 131 131 127 106 96 95 91 101 
Macedonia 110 113 106 113 109 97 77 62 66  
Montenegro 70 65 75 82 93 94 109 126 114 105 
Source: World Economic Forum 
 
According to Table 3, we can observe that rank of Efficacy of corporate boards 
indicator was the best for Montenegro from 2008-2009 to 2013-2014. After that 
period, from 2014-15 to 2016-17 Macedonia was the best ranked according to this 
indicator. In each year from 2008-2009 to 2014-2015, Serbia had the worst rank of 
this indicator, but since 2012-2013 Serbia's position has been continuously 
improving. Montenegro had the worst rank from 2015-2016 to 2017-2018.  
 
The characteristic of corporate governance, observing the protection of minority 






























Serbia 132 128 137 140 143 144 138 138 134 132 
Croatia 99 111 123 125 120 114 105 111 96 102 
Macedonia 105 107 112 109 123 78 53 73 76  
Montenegro 88 82 87 71 65 70 84 102 110 90 
Serbia 132 128 137 140 143 144 138 138 134 132 
Source: World Economic Forum 
 
From the Table 4 we can see that in individual years from 2008-2009 to 2013-2014, 
Montenegro had the best rank of Protection of minority shareholders’ interests 
indicator, while Macedonia had the best rank of this indicator from 2014-2015 to 
2016-2017. In all individual years of the observed period, Serbia had the worst rank 
of this indicator, but the improvement trend has been noticed since 2014-2015. 
Results of descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the whole period from 2008 to 2018 by countries and for 
selected Western Balkan countries by years are presented in Tables 5 and 6, 
respectively. 
 













M S.D. M S.D. M S.D. M S.D. M S.D. 
Serbia 3.90 0.09 3.25 0.09 3.32 0.19 3.98 0.34 2.89 0.19 
Croatia 4.10 0.07 3.61 0.09 3.76 0.18 4.17 0.29 3.63 0.19 
Macedonia 4.09 0.15 3.88 0.24 3.86 0.27 4.33 0.33 3.90 0.26 
Montenegro 4.18 0.09 4.15 0.26 4.11 0.20 4.36 0.21 3.99 0.23 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on WEF. 
Note: 1 is the worst score, 7 is the best score. M is Mean; S.D. is Standard Deviation. 
 
Montenegro has the best average score for all indicators, but the worst average score 
was noticed for Serbia. However, for Institutions indicator, Montenegro has the 
highest volatility measured by standard deviation. According to GCI, after 
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Montenegro, Croatia has the best average value, with the lowest standard deviation. 
Macedonia has the best average score after Montenegro for Ethical behaviour of 
firms indicator. However, this indicator has the highest volatility for Macedonia. It 
is similar for Efficacy of corporate boards and Protection of minority shareholders’ 
interests indicators. After Montenegro, Macedonia has the best average scores for 
both aforementioned indicators, but Macedonia also has the highest standard 
deviations of these indicators. Croatia is for Institutions, Ethical behaviour of firms, 
Efficacy of corporate boards and Protection of minority shareholders’ interests 
indicators, positioned immediately behind Macedonia, but Croatia has a significant 
lower volatility of average scores for these indicators (see Table 5). 
 













M S.D. M S.D. M S.D. M S.D. M S.D. 
2008-09 4.03 0.17 3.72 0.29 3.83 0.21 4.30 0.29 3.85 0.45 
2009-10 3.98 0.16 3.72 0.43 3.85 0.37 4.13 0.32 3.70 0.45 
2010-11 4.07 0.22 3.76 0.53 3.80 0.49 4.03 0.36 3.53 0.46 
2011-12 4.07 0.16 3.74 0.58 3.65 0.58 4.00 0.32 3.53 0.59 
2012-13 4.00 0.08 3.73 0.51 3.63 0.45 4.00 0.26 3.48 0.66 
2013-14 4.05 0.17 3.75 0.44 3.80 0.35 4.13 0.29 3.60 0.64 
2014-15 4.13 0.17 3.78 0.48 3.88 0.37 4.15 0.29 3.68 0.67 
2015-16 4.13 0.17 3.70 0.39 3.83 0.33 4.35 0.34 3.53 0.54 
2016-17 4.10 0.08 3.68 0.30 3.70 0.32 4.58 0.25 3.58 0.42 
2017-18 4.13 0.06 3.60 0.26 3.60 0.35 4.50 0.10 3.47 0.42 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on WEF. 
Note: 1 is the worst score, 7 is the best score. M is Mean; S.D. is Standard Deviation. 
 
The highest average value of GCI on the Western Balkan was 4.13 in following years 
2014-2015, 2015-2016, 2017-2018, while the lowest average value of this indicator 
was 3.98 in 2009-2010. The highest volatility of GCI (0.22) was in 2010-2011. The 
highest average values for Institutions and Ethical behaviour of firms indicators were 
in 2014-2015, but the lowest average values of these indicators were in 2017-18. The 
volatility of both abovementioned indicators was the highest in 2011-2012 and it was 
0.58. The highest average value of Efficacy of corporate boards indicator is observed 
in 2016-2017, while the lowest average value of this indicator is observed in 2011-
2012, but its volatility was the highest in 2010-2011. Protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests indicator had the highest average value in 2008-09, while it’s 
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the lowest average value was in 2017-2018. The volatility of this indicator was (0.67) 
the highest in 2014-2015. We note that the value of this volatility measured by 
standard deviation is the highest in comparison with all other standard deviations of 
the analysed indicators.   
CONCLUSION 
The corporate accountability and corporate ethics affect the quality of the 
institutional environment as the mechanisms of corporate governance. In this paper, 
we were considering corporate accountability's changes in four Western Balkan 
countries: Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. The corporate boards' 
efficacy and the protection of minority shareholders' interests are used as the 
determinants of corporate accountability. The analysis is based on the WEF 
indicators for the period 2008-2018 for selected countries.  
 
During the observed period, all analysed countries have a better rank of Institutions 
indicator and GCI than ranks Protection of minority shareholders’ interests 
indicators. The WB countries' ranks of Ethical behaviour of firms indicator are better 
than ranks of Institutions indicator in last three observed years. The relation between 
Institutions indicator and Efficacy of corporate boards indicator ranks is different 
depending on observed countries and years. The rank of Efficacy of corporate boards 
indicator was the best for Montenegro from 2008-2009 to 2013-2014. Macedonia 
was the best ranked according to this indicator from 2014-15 to 2016-17. In each 
year from 2008-2009 to 2014-2015, Serbia had the worst rank of this indicator, but 
since 2012-2013 Serbia's position has been continuously improving. Montenegro 
had the worst rank from 2015-2016 to 2017-2018. Serbia had the worst rank of 
Protection of minority shareholders’ interests indicator in the whole observed period, 
but the improvement trend has been noticed since 2014-2015. Montenegro had the 
best rank of Protection of minority shareholders’ interests indicator in the period 
from 2008-2009 to 2013-2014, and Macedonia in the period from 2014-2015 to 
2016-2017.  
 
Our results of descriptive statistics by countries show that Montenegro has the best 
average score for all indicators, and Serbia has the worst average score. Montenegro 
also has the highest volatility of Institutions indicator. After Montenegro, Macedonia 
has the best average scores and the highest volatilities for Ethical behaviour of firms, 
Efficacy of corporate boards and Protection of minority shareholders’ interests 
indicators. Observing abovementioned indicators, Croatia is positioned behind 
Macedonia, but Croatia has a significant lower volatility of average values for these 
indicators. Descriptive statistics for selected WB countries by years shows that the 
highest average value of Efficacy of corporate boards indicator was in 2016-2017, 
while the lowest average value of this indicator is observed in 2011-2012. Protection 
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of minority shareholders’ interests indicator had the highest average value in 2008-
09, while it’s the lowest average value was in 2017-2018. The highest average values 
for Institutions and Ethical behaviour of firms indicators were in 2014-2015, but the 
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